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The present study advocates a simulation approach to analyze quantitatively the impact of 
having locally-based markets for price derivatives.  A major result is that market outcomes do 
not appear to be sensitive to most of the underlying parameters of the model other than demand 
elasticity and transportation costs.  For the case of inelastic demand, introduction of a futures 
market in a country provides domestic producers with a competitive edge if transportation costs 
are relatively high, but the opposite is true for relatively low transportation costs.  The most 
important insight of the present analysis is that, under realistic scenarios it need not be the case 
that local producers will gain a competitive edge over foreign producers by introducing a futures 
market based on the local spot prices. 
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HOW LARGE IS THE COMPETITIVE EDGE THAT 
U.S.-BASED FUTURES PROVIDE TO U.S. FARMERS? 
 
U.S. farmers have had access to futures markets for corn and other agricultural commodities for 
well over a century.  U.S. futures for the main agricultural commodities are the most liquid in the 
world, and are routinely used by many foreign trader and producers to hedge their exposure to 
price risk.  So ingrained is futures hedging in the marketing of agricultural commodities in the 
U.S. that the competitive edge conferred by such markets to U.S. producers has been largely 
neglected by the economics literature. 
More specifically, the fact that the world's best functioning futures markets are for U.S. 
agricultural commodities allows U.S. producers to manage their price risk exposure better than 
foreign producers.  Everything else equal, such enhanced risk-management provides U.S. 
producers a competitive edge over their foreign counterparts.  However, to the extent that U.S. 
producers modify their output decisions in response to enhanced hedging opportunities, 
equilibrium in the spot commodity markets will be affected as well.  Conceptually, since the 
latter aggregate market effect may have a negative impact on the revenues of U.S. producers, 
having local futures markets need not provide them with a competitive edge overall. 
In principle, two basic approaches could be used to study the study the impact of adding 
a futures market to the spot market for a commodity of interest.  One approach consists of 
performing an econometric study of the commodity market under analysis using data 
corresponding to the periods with and without futures market.  Comparison of the estimated 
models for the two periods would then provide a quantitative assessment of the impact of the 
futures market.  Despite its apparent appeal, however, the econometric approach has important 
limitations.  First, much of the price and quantity data for commodity markets are highly volatile, 
thereby greatly reducing the power of the econometric tests.  Second, often times other important 
events may occur at the same time a futures market is introduced.  This leads to identification 
problems, as it is impossible to disentangle the effects of introducing futures from the impact of   2
the other events.  Third, to identify the effects on producer decisions, one would need long data 
series regarding individual producer decisions, and such data are rarely available.  For the 
present study, the problems are exacerbated by the fact that most of the futures markets for the 
major agricultural commodities have been in place for over a century.  This severely hampers the 
availability of data previous to the introduction of such markets. 
The second approach, and the one advocated here, consists of counterfactual simulations.  
Succinctly, this method involves constructing a simulation model based on economic theory, and 
calibrating its parameters to reflect as closely as possible the behavior of the market of choice.  A 
major advantage of the simulation approach is that it avoids the famous “Lucas’ critique,” 
because the model built depends only on behavioral parameters that are not affected by shifts in 
policy regimes such as the one under consideration.  However, as with all simulation-based 
research, the present results are only as accurate as the assumptions upon which the model is 
based.  Therefore, caution must be exercised when interpreting these numbers within a policy 
context. 
Succinctly, the present study contributes to the literature by employing a simulation 
approach to analyze quantitatively the impact of having locally-based markets for price 
derivatives on farmers’ well being and on market variables of interest (e.g., production, 
consumption, exports, prices). 
 
A Theoretical Model of the Commodity Market 
The present study of the impact of local derivative markets is based on a standard commodity 
trade model.  The relevant market for the commodity is assumed to consist of I countries that 
trade with each other until all arbitrage opportunities are exhausted.  The scenario without 
derivatives markets in any country is laid out in the next subsection.  This is followed by a 
discussion of the modifications that ensue when a local derivatives market is introduced in one 
of the countries. 
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The Commodity Market in the Absence of Derivatives Markets 
Consumption in country i is inversely related to the contemporaneous realization of the local 
commodity price (Pit), and is also affected by other exogenous variables such as income: 
 
(1.1)  Dit = di(Pit, eDit). 
 
In (1.1), di(⋅) is a demand function satisfying ∂di(⋅)/∂Pit < 0, and eDit represents the other variables 
that impact consumption of the commodity in country i. 
Commodity production is assumed to take one period and be subject to random 
exogenous shocks (e.g., weather shocks).  More specifically, the input choices made by a 
representative producer at time t – 1 determine the expected output at t [Qit−1 ≡ Et−1(Sit)].  The 
actual output at t (Sit) further depends on the realization of the random shock at time t (eSit): 
 
(1.2)  Sit = Qit−1 × eSit. 
 
By definition of Qit−1, the random shock in (1.2) satisfies the condition Et−1(eSit) = 1. 
The representative producer is postulated to be an expected-utility maximizer, so that his 
objective function at time t – 1 consists of (1.3): 
 
(1.3)  Et−1{Ui[πit(Qit−1)]}. 
1 − it Q max
 
In (1.3), Et−1(⋅) denotes the expectations operator conditional on information at time t – 1, Ui(⋅) is 
the producer’s utility function, and πit(⋅) are profits at time t.  In the absence of derivatives 
markets, the latter are simply revenues minus costs: 
 
(1.4)  πit(Lit−1) = Pit Qit−1 eSit – Ci(Qit−1). 
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Function Ci(⋅) represents the cost of planned output Qit−1 and satisfies standard properties (i.e., 
Ci’(⋅) > 0 and Ci”(⋅) > 0). 
At period t, the commodity can be transported between countries i and j at cost Tijt.  
Allowing for trade across countries, market clearing requires that world demand be equal to 
world supply, so that equality (1.5) must be met: 
 












Equilibrium implies the absence of arbitrage opportunities.  Hence, given the output decisions 
made by producers at time t – 1, transportation costs, and the realizations of the demand and 
supply shocks at t, in equilibrium prices and net exports must satisfy condition (1.6) for all i and 
j ≠ i: 
 
(1.6)  Pjt − Pit − Tijt ≤ 0, xijt ≥ 0, (Pjt − Pit − Tijt) xijt = 0, 
 
where xijt are exports from country i to country j. 
To close the model it is necessary to postulate a joint probability density function (pdf) 
for all of the exogenous random variables, and to determine the way by which producers form 
their expectations in (1.3).  The exogenous pdfs used are discussed below in the “Model 
Initialization” section.  As per the expectation formation mechanism, rational expectations are 
invoked.  This means that expression (1.3) assumes correct expectations, in the sense that 
producers’ subjective pdfs attach the same weights to the future states of nature as the true pdf 
does.  Given equations (1.1) through (1.6) plus the joint pdf for the exogenous variables and the 
rational expectation assumption, the model can be solved.  The procedure to do so is explained in 
later in the “Numerical Methods” section. 
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The Commodity Market in the Presence of a Local Derivatives Market in Country A 
Consider now the introduction of a futures market for the commodity, and let   denote the 
futures price at time t1 for maturity at time t2 ≥ t1.  Allowing producers in country i to hedge with 
futures, their objective function becomes (1.7) instead of (1.3), with profits defined as in (1.8) 
instead of (1.4): 
2 1,t t F
 
(1.7)  Et−1{Ui[πit(Qit−1,  )]},  F
it it H Q max
1 1, − −
F
it H 1 −
 
(1.8)  πit(Qit−1,  ) = Pit Qit−1 eSit – C(Qit−1) + (Ft−1,t − Ft,t)  , 
F
it H 1 −
F
it H 1 −
 
where   is the amount hedged in futures by the representative producer in country i.  The 
futures hedge is the quantity of commodity sold short in the futures market at time t – 1 for price 
Ft−1,t and bought back at time t for price Ft,t. 
F
it H 1 −
  Additionally allowing for a market in at-the-money put options on futures further 
expands the decision set of producers.  In such an instance, the objective function consists of 
(1.9), and profits are given by (1.10): 
 
(1.9)  Et−1{Ui[πit(Qit−1,  ,  )]}.  O
it
F
it it H H Q max
1 1 1 , , − − −
F
it H 1 −
O
it H 1 −
 
(1.10)  πit(Qit−1,  ,  ) = Pit Qit−1 eSit – C(Qit−1) + (Ft−1,t − Ft,t)    
F
it H 1 −
O
it H 1 −
F
it H 1 −
 
+ [max(Ft−1,t − Ft,t, 0) – Ot−1]  . 
O
it H 1 −
 
In the above expressions,   is the put hedge and Ot−1 is the premium for the at-the-money 
futures put option at time t – 1.  The term max(Ft−1,t − Ft,t, 0) is the payoff from the futures put 
(recall that the put is assumed to be at the money, so its strike price at time t – 1 is equal to the 
futures price Ft−1,t). 
O
it H 1 −  6
To solve for the commodity market equilibrium in the presence of a futures market 
requires the definition of equilibrium values for futures prices Ft−1,t and Ft,t.  Note, however, that 
futures price Ft,t is the spot price for the commodity in the local market of reference.  Hence, if 
the local market of reference corresponds to country A (i.e., country A is the one with a “local” 
futures market), it follows that: 
 
(1.11)  Ft,t = PAt. 
 
Expression (1.11) implies that country A has no basis risk, whereas all other countries face some 
basis risk.  To identify futures price Ft−1,t it is assumed that futures prices are unbiased, so that 
Ft−1,t = Et−1(Ft,t).
1  Given (1.11), this assumption implies that: 
 
(1.12)  Ft−1,t = Et−1(PAt). 
 
In addition, when there is also a market for put options on futures, it is necessary to define the 
equilibrium premium on such options (Ot−1).  Consistent with the assumption of unbiased 
futures, it is assumed that options are fairly priced: 
 
(1.13)  Ot−1 = Et−1[max(Ft−1,t − Ft,t, 0)], 
         = Et−1{max[Et−1(PAt) − PAt, 0]}. 
 
That is, the premium on the futures put equals the expected payoff of the at-the-money futures 
put. 
 
                                                           
1Recall that expectations are rational, so the expectations are taken with respect to the “true” pdf of Ft,t.   7
Model Initialization 
For even the simplest parameterizations of interest, the postulated theoretical model does not 
have an analytical solution.  Hence, we resort to numerical simulations to analyze the 
implications of the model.  The numerical analysis requires specific functional forms for the 
demand functions, supply functions, utility functions of producers, as well as pdfs for the 




For the demand function, we adopt the standard isoelastic form (2.1): 
 





where δ0i > 0 is a scaling parameter and δ1i < 0 is the own-price elasticity of demand.  On the 
supply side, producers’ preferences are represented by a constant relative risk aversion utility 
function (2.2), whereas the cost function is assumed to be isoelastic as in (2.3): 
 


























In (2.2), parameter γ0i > −min(πit) can be interpreted as an initial wealth level, whereas γ1i > 0 
denotes the coefficient of absolute risk aversion.
2  As per the cost function (2.3), α0i > 0 is a 
scaling factor and parameter α1i > 1 determines the own-price elasticity of supply (the latter 
would equal 1/(α1i – 1) in a deterministic setting). 
                                                           
2Note that the coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA) is defined here as CRRA = − (πit + γ0i) U”/U’ > 0.   8
Without loss of generality, demand shocks (eDit) are normalized to have mean equal to 
one, and are assumed to be multivariate normally distributed and independent from the supply 
shocks: 
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where σDi > 0 is the standard deviation of the demand shock in country i and ρDij (|ρDij| < 1) is 
the correlation between demand shocks in countries i and j. 
By definition, supply shocks (eSit) have mean equal to one.  Paralleling the assumed pdf 
for the demand shocks, supply shocks are postulated to be multivariate normally distributed: 
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Parameters σSi > 0 and ρSij (|ρSij| < 1) denote respectively the standard deviation of supply shocks 
in country i and the correlation between supply shocks in countries i and j. 
Transportation costs are also assumed to be random, following a multivariate normal 
distribution independent from the demand and supply shocks: 
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with obvious definitions for στij > 0 and ρτ,ij,kl (|ρτ,ij,kl| < 1). 
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Parameterization 
Specific parameter values are needed for the simulations, including the number of countries 
making up the world market for the commodity (I).  To focus on the impact of introducing a 
local derivatives market, we assume that countries are identical in all respects, except for the 
potential existence of a local derivatives market in one of them.  To further simplify the analysis, 
we further restrict the analysis to the two-country case (i.e., I = 2).  This procedure facilitates 
isolating the key factors affecting the quantitative impact of introducing a local derivatives 
market.  In what follows, whenever it is necessary to distinguish between the country with the 
local derivatives market and the country facing basis risk, the former will be labeled “A” and the 
latter will be labeled “B.” 
  To improve the accuracy of the numerical procedures, the demand and cost functions are 
normalized so as to yield equilibrium price, output and demand equal to unity for each country in 
the limiting case of non-stochastic shocks.  This requires setting δ0 = 1 and α0 = 1/α1 for all of 
the simulations.  Utility parameter γ0 is fixed at γ0 = 2 across all simulations to prevent numerical 
problems arising from a negative argument in the power utility function.  For the other 
parameters, the values corresponding to the baseline scenario chosen are summarized in the 
“Baseline Value” column of Table 1. 
The baseline parameter values are selected to render the simulations as realistic as 
possible, based on the existing literature and on available historical data.  To put in perspective 
the magnitudes of the parameters for the transportation cost pdf and the standard deviations of 
the demand and supply shocks, recall that the scaling parameters are normalized to yield non-
stochastic equilibrium price output and consumption equal to one in each country.  Hence, the 
baseline transportation cost parameters amount to transportation costs of about 20% of prices, 
with a coefficient of variation of 20%.  Similarly, the standard deviation of the demand (supply) 
shocks amounts to a coefficient of variation for demand (supply) in the order of 6% (18%).  To 
explore the robustness of the results to alternative parameterizations, simulations were also 
conducted for the ranges of parameter values reported in the “Sensitivity Range” column of   10
Table 1.  The sensitivity range of the production cost parameter α1 implies (non-stochastic) 
supply elasticities between 0.1 and 0.9.  To avoid unrealistically high transportation cost 
volatilities, for sensitivity purposes the coefficient of variation of transportation costs is capped 
at 20%, so that the range for στAB is [0, 0.2 τAB]. 
 
Numerical Methods 
Solving the model amounts to calculating each country’s equilibrium producer decision 
variables.  For the scenarios with both futures and option markets, the equilibrium variables are 
obtained using the following algorithm:
3 
Step 1. Make an educated guess for the initial vector of producer decision variables [Q , 





















Step 2. Repeat the following sub-step for each of the N states of nature: 
Sub-step 2.1. Given   and Q , the supply and demand shocks in each country, 
and the transportation cost shocks in state of nature n, calculate the 
prices and exports that satisfy both the market-clearing condition (1.5) 
and the no-arbitrage condition (1.6) [ ,  ,  ,  ]. 
) 0 (











Step 3. Given the probability of occurrence of the nth state of nature wn and the 
corresponding prices in country A ( ), calculate the futures price from (1.12) 
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Step 4. Given the probability of occurrence of the nth state of nature wn, the corresponding 
prices   and  , futures price   and the option premium O , obtain the 











                                                           
3Note that the assumption that shocks are not autocorrelated greatly simplify the solution, because it implies that the 
equilibrium producer decision variables at t are also equilibrium variables for all u ≠ t.   11
[ ,  ,  ] =   Σn wn U[ (Qit−1,  ,  )], 
) 1 (








it H − O
it
F
it it H H Q argmax




it H 1 −
O
it H 1 −
 




it H 1 −
O








it H 1 −
 
+ [max(  −  , 0) – O ]  . 
) 0 (






it H 1 −
 
Step 5. Calculate the largest absolute difference between the initial and the new decision 
variables:  η ≡ max(|Q  −  |, |  −  |, |  −  |, |  − Q |, 
|  −  |, |  −  |).  If η is smaller than a prescribed tolerance level, 
the model is solved with equilibrium decision vector [ ,  ,  , Q , 
,  ].  Otherwise, repeat Steps 1 through 5 using the new decision vector 
[ ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ] instead of the initial vector [ ,  , 














































































































As shown in Step 2 of the above algorithm, the solution involves calculating the prices 
that satisfy simultaneously the market-clearing condition (1.5) and the no-arbitrage condition 
(1.6) for each state of nature.  This requires an approximation, because the normal pdfs imply an 
infinite number of states of nature.  To maximize efficiency, the approximation used to the 
continuous pdfs is a 6-point Gaussian quadrature for each of the five random shocks (Miranda 
and Fackler, Ch. 5).  By adopting this procedure, the number of states of nature is reduced from 
infinity to a manageable N = 15,625 (= 5
6).  For each of these states, the prices and exports that 
simultaneously solve conditions (1.5) and (1.6) are calculated by means of the bisection method 
(Miranda and Fackler, Ch. 3).  The vector of optimal decision variables in Step 4 is obtained 
employing Newton’s method (Miranda and Fackler, Ch. 3).  The model is implemented in the 
programming language MATLAB version 6.5, using the toolbox of computer routines 
CompEcon Toolbox developed by Miranda and Fackler. 
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Results and Discussion 
Results for the baseline scenario are reported in the “Inelastic Demand” columns of Table 2.  
The “No Futures” column shows the expected levels of the main variables of interest in the 
absence of futures markets.  Also shown are their standard deviations, which appear within 
parentheses below the corresponding expected values.  For example, total world output on 
average equals 1.974 commodity units, with a standard deviation of 0.251 units.  As countries 
are identically parameterized for the “No Futures” scenario, the expected values and the standard 
deviations of production, consumption, exports, and prices are identical for both countries.  
Because of the market-clearing condition, expected output equals expected consumption for each 
country.  However, consumption volatility is significantly smaller than production volatility in 
each country due to trade.  Exports represent slightly more than 3% of production for each 
country.  Expected prices equal $1.088 per commodity unit in each country, and have an 
associated standard deviation of $0.330/unit.  Because of the absence of derivatives markets, 
there are no hedge ratios to speak of.  The last two rows show that certainty equivalents for 
commodity producers are $0.672.
4 
Under the baseline scenario, the introduction of a futures market in country A has a 
noticeable impact on the commodity market.  Expected production in country A increases by 
0.77%.  However, expected production in country B increases by a considerably larger 1.08%.  
Even more interestingly, A expected exports decline by 1.62%, whereas B expected exports (i.e., 
A imports) actually increase by almost the same amount (1.58%).  The reduced expected exports 
and larger expected imports by A lead to an increase in A's expected consumption (0.88%) that 
exceeds A's increase in expected output (0.77%).  For B, the situation is reversed.  As a result of 
the higher expected output, expected prices drop by a sizeable 1.73% in A and 1.90% in B.  The 
bigger price decline in A compared to B is consistent with the reduction in expected exports by A 
                                                           
4To put in perspective the impact of random shocks on the commodity market, it is worth noting that the 
normalizations used imply that in the limit where all exogenous variables are nonstochastic, in equilibrium each 
country produces and consumes one unit of commodity, exports nothing, prices are $1/unit of commodity, and 
profits are $0.667 (i.e., certainty equivalents are $0.667).   13
and the simultaneous increase in expected exports by B.  In equilibrium, producers in A hedge in 
the futures market 38.9% of their expected output.  Puzzlingly, producers in B hedge an even 
larger percentage (44.6%) of their expected production. 
The percentage changes in expected output and prices indicate that producers in both 
countries experience a decline in expected revenues.  However, the certainty equivalent figures 
indicate that commodity producers in both countries benefit from the introduction of a futures 
market in country A.  For this to happen, it must be the case that the negative impact on revenues 
is outweighed by the gains in risk reduction attained by futures hedging.  Interestingly, the 
increase in certainty equivalents for B producers is more than three times greater than the 
analogous increase for A producers.  This is largely due to the larger expected decline in 
revenues for A producers. 
The introduction of an options market when there is already a futures market in place in 
country A has a relatively minor impact on the commodity market.  Expected output in A 
increases by a mere 0.04% of the expected output under futures, whereas expected output in B 
declines by a negligible amount (0.001%).  The increase in expected exports by A (0.19%) is 
matched by the decline in B's expected exports.  Expected prices exhibit a tiny decline in both 
countries (0.04% in A and 0.02% in B). 
In the presence of a put market, A (B) producers hedge 32.2% (42.6%) of their expected 
output in futures and an additional 19.8% (6.6%) in long puts.  Interestingly, the percentage 
changes in certainty equivalents show that producers in both countries are worse off (albeit 
marginally so) by adding an options market to the existing futures market. 
Except for changes in transportation costs and demand elasticities, the qualitative results 
just described are very robust to changes in parameters over the sensitivity ranges reported in 
Table 1.
5  Figures 1 through 4 are provided to illustrate the sensitivity results for expected 
                                                           
5This assertion is particularly true for the results regarding the introduction of a futures market.  The additional 
introduction of an options market tends to be characterized by more nonlinearities, but the resulting market effects 
are substantially smaller than the impacts of futures alone.  Therefore, the following discussion focuses on the 
introduction of futures markets only.   14
transportation costs and non-stochastic supply elasticities.  Figure 1 shows that the percentage 
increase in expected output is greater the greater the supply elasticity.  However, for a given 
supply elasticity, the increase in expected output is non-monotonic.  For example, when the 
supply elasticity is 0.5, A's (B's) increase in expected output is minimum (maximum) for 
expected transportation costs of 0.15 (0.10).  Figure 2 reveals that percentage changes in 
expected exports are not monotonic either on expected transportation costs.  Thus, when 
transportation costs are about 0.10, A (B) exports decrease (increase) as the supply elasticity 
increases, but the opposite is true for expected transportation costs of 0.40.  Figure 3 shows that 
percentage declines in expected prices are greater the greater the supply elasticity.  For large 
expected transportation costs and supply elasticities, however, the percentage price decline is 
large for A but small for B.  The reason for this is that large transportation costs tend make the 
situation closer to autarky, so a futures market in A is less useful to B producers, whose output 
response is diminished (see Figure 1).  In turn, this means that the impact of the futures market in 
A tends to concentrate on country A when expected transportation costs are large. 
Percentage increases in certainty equivalents are highest when supply elasticity is 
smallest (see Figure 4).  This result is to be expected, because the inelastic demand (δ1 = −0.5) 
used for the simulations implies smaller expected revenues with increased expected output.  
Thus, in the absence of supply response, the percentage change in certainty equivalent only 
reflects the risk-reducing benefits stemming from the introduction of the futures market. 
As pointed out earlier, the qualitative results are very sensitive to the elasticity of 
demand.  To better highlight this point, results for an elastic demand (δ1 = −1.30) are reported in 
the last three columns of Table 2.  In this instance, introduction of a futures market improves the 
well being of producers in A but leaves producers in B worse off.  However, the realism of this 
scenario is questionable, because the model implies that producers in A actually buy futures (i.e., 
perform a "Texas hedge").  Thus, caution should be exercised when interpreting these results. 
Figures 5 through 9 illustrate the sensitivity of the main variables of interest to 
transportation costs and demand elasticities.  The most important insight from the graphs is that,   15
when demand is inelastic, the effect of introducing a futures market is very sensitive to the 
magnitude of transportation costs.  For large transportation costs (e.g., expected transportation 
costs above 0.30) having a local futures market provides a competitive edge to producers in 
country A.  In contrast, for low transportation costs (e.g. expected transportation costs below 
0.20) a local futures market benefits producers in B far more than producers in A. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
The present study advocates a simulation approach to analyze quantitatively the impact of 
having locally-based markets for price derivatives.  A major result is that market outcomes do 
not appear to be sensitive to most of the underlying parameters of the model other than demand 
elasticity and transportation costs.  For the case of inelastic demand, introduction of a futures 
market in a country provides domestic producers with a competitive edge if transportation costs 
are relatively high, but the opposite is true for relatively low transportation costs.  The most 
important insight of the present analysis is that, under realistic scenarios it need not be the case 
that local producers will gain a competitive edge over foreign producers by introducing a futures 
market based on the local spot prices. 
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able 1.  Parameterizations used for the simulations. 
Function Parameter  Baseline  Value  Sensitivity  Range 
Demand  δ0 1  - 
  δ1  −0.5 [−1.5, −0.5] 
Production cost  α0 1/3 1/α1 
  α1 3  [2.11,  11] 
Utility  γ0 2  - 
  γ1 6  [2,  8] 
Demand shock pdf  σD 0.06  [0.02,  0.16] 
  ρDAB 0  [0,  0.6] 
Supply shock pdf  σS 0.18  [0.10,  0.45] 
  ρSAB 0  [0,  0.6] 
Transportation shock pdf  τAB 0.2  [0,  0.40] 
  στAB 0.04  [0,  0.2  τAB] 
   18
Table 2.  Results for baseline parameterization under inelastic and elastic demand. 
 
 Inelastic  Demand 
(Demand Elasticity = −0.50) 
 Elastic  Demand 



















Stochastic Variables:                     
Output:  A 0.987  0.77 0.04 0.991  0.19 0.005 
    (0.1 8)  7   (0. 7)  7   (0.04) (0.178)  (0. 9)  1   (0.0 5)  0      
               B  0.987  1.08  −0.001  0.991  −0.01  0.001 
    (0.1 8)  7   (1.08)  (−0.001)  (0.178)  (−0.01)  (0.001)         
               World  1.974  0.93 0.02 1.983  0.09 0.003 
    (0.2 1)  5   (0. 3)  9   (0.02) (0.252)  (0. 9)  0   (0.0 3)  0      
Consumption:  A 0.987  0.88 0.02 0.991  0.16 0.005 
    (0.1 6)  3   (0. 9)  8   (0.04) (0.155)  (0. 4)  2   (0.01)       
                         B  0.987  0.98 0.01 0.991  0.03 0.002 
    (0.1 6)  3   (1.24)  (−0.001)  (0.155)  (−0.03)  (0.0003)         
Exports:  A 0.032  −1.62  0.19  0.013  1.29 0.03 
    (0.0 1)  6   (−0.35)  (0.10)  (0.039)  (0. 8)  6   (0.02)        
                B  0.032  1.58  −0.19  0.013  −1.31  −0.03 
    (0.0 1)  6   (1.26)  (−0.09)  (0.039)  (−0 1)  .6   (−0.01)        
Price:  A 1.088  −1.73  −0.04  1.023  −0.12  −0.003 
    (0.3 0)  3   (−1 4)  .7   (−0.03)  (0.132)  (−0 1)  .0   (−0.001)       
           B  1.088  −1.90  −0.02  1.023  −0.02  −0.001 
    (0.3 0)  3   (−1 8)  .6   (−0.04)  (0.132)  (−0 0)  .1   (−0.003)       
Nonstochastic Variables:                         
F   utures HR:  A  Not applic.  0.389  0.322  Not applic. −0.328  −0.416           
                         B  Not applic.  0.446  0.426  Not applic. 0.050  0.089           
Puts HR:  A  Not applic. Not applic. 0.198  Not applic. Not applic.  0.202             
                 B  Not applic. Not applic. 0.066  Not applic. Not applic.  −0.091           
C   ert. Equiv.:  A 0.6 2  7   0.12  −0.001  0.659  0. 6  1   0.0 5  0       
                          B  0.672  0.45  −0.03  0.659  −0.02  0.0001           
Note:  Figures bolded for "Futures Only" and "Futures and Puts" designate percentage changes with respect to the 
corresponding "No Futures" and "Futures Only" values, respectively.  Figures not bolded for stochastic variables 
denote expected values (not within parenthesis) and standard deviations (within parenthesis).  Figures not bolded for 
nonstochastic variables designated "HR" and "Cert. Equiv." denote equilibrium hedge ratios and equilibrium 
commodity producer certainty equivalents, respectively.  Futures hedge ratios and puts hedge ratios for country i are 
defined as  /Q  and  /Q , respectively.  The certainty equivalent of random profit 
F
it H 1 − 1 − it
P
it H 1 − 1 − it π ~  for commodity 
producer i is given by CEi(π ~ ) ≡ U {E
1 −
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Figure 4.  Percentage change in certainty equivalents due to the introduction of a futures market. 
 
 

















































Country A, Demand Elasticity = -0.5 Country B, Demand Elasticity = -0.5
Country A, Demand Elasticity = -1.3 Country B, Demand Elasticity = -1.3Figure 6.  Percentage changes in expected consumption due to the 
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Country A, Demand Elasticity = -0.5 Country B, Demand Elasticity = -0.5

















































Country A, Demand Elasticity = -0.5 Country B, Demand Elasticity = -0.5



















































Country A, Demand Elasticity = -0.5 Country B, Demand Elasticity = -0.5
Country A, Demand Elasticity = -1.3 Country B, Demand Elasticity = -1.3